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Dr. Michael Pillsbury, the author of the book, 
The Hundred-Year Marathon,1 reveals at length how 
the past eight United States presidents, from Richard 
Nixon through Barack Obama, had carried out, as a 
matter of policy, a series of initiatives to strengthen 
China against its adversaries. For more than 40 
years, the United States has helped China to build 
the world’s No. 2 economy and develop its scientific 
and military capabilities in pursuit of the “Chinese 
Dream” in the realization of the “great renewal of 
the Chinese nation,” to use Xi Jinping’s pet phrase.2 
Dr. Pillsbury “was among the first people to 
provide intelligence to the White House favoring an 
overture to China, in 1969.”3 Since then, for decades, 
he “played a sometimes prominent role in urging 
administrations of both parties to provide China 
with technological and military assistance.”4 As he 
acknowledges, “as a China expert who has worked in 
the Congress and in the executive branch for every 
administration since Richard Nixon’s, [he has] argu-
ably had more access to China’s military and intelli-
gence establishment than any other Westerner.”5 For 
such an expert to confess that he has failed to detect 
the Chinese hidden strategy of world dominance and 
has been misled and deceived by the Chinese coun-
terpart is an extraordinary admission.
I
According to Pillsbury, for the past 40 years, the 
Chinese hawks through the leadership of Beijing, 
manipulated American policy makers to obtain 
intell igence and military, technological, and 
economic assistance. The source of that project 
is what the Chinese hawks instilled in the minds 
of all the leaders since Mao Zedong a plan that 
became known as “the Hundred-Year Marathon”6 in 
order “to avenge a century of humiliation” and “to 
replace the United States as the economic, military 
and political leader of the world by the year 2049 
(the one hundredth anniversary of the Communist 
Revolution).”7 That is the title of the book.
U.S. assistance to the development of China was 
not limited to innocuous “cultural exchanges” in 
academia, but it purposefully focused on military 
know-how and engineering. It provided China with 
“major weapons systems” to strengthen its “army, 
navy, and air force, and even to help China to expand 
its marine corps.”8 It also extended to “genetic engi-
neering, intelligent robotics, artificial intelligence, 
automation, biotechnology, lasers, supercomputers, 
space technology, and manned spaceflight.”9 Behind 
such expanding aid programs for China in the past 
decades, notes Pillsbury, are “American business 
leaders eager to maintain their growing relation-
ships and business opportunities, as China almost 
certainly promised to be the largest emerging market 
in the world.”10 The same expectations were behind 
the Open Door Policy for China in the 19th century 
just like Europeans today who have flocked to the 
newly established Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank.   
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The book is far from the author’s exposé of 
Chinese state secrets; rather, it is the review of US 
relations with China on the basis of the author’s 
awaken awareness that the Chinese hawks’ asser-
tion is “the mainstream of Chinese geopolitical 
thought.”11 As the author acknowledges, the book 
took 50 years in the making through his career of 
research and intelligence analysis including rare 
opportunities of discussions and exchanges of views 
with 34 Chinese “scholar generals.”12 Nevertheless, it 
must be remembered that, as the author noted, “None 
ever violated his or her oath to protect national 
secrets and uphold the Party line”13 and there is 
no new disclosure of information or new exposé. 
Needless to say, as stated at the outset in the form of 
Author’s Note, “The CIA, the FBI, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, and an agency of the Defense 
Department reviewed this book prior to publication 
to ensure that there was no disclosure of classified 
information.”14 
What is astonishing about the book is that 
American experts in China or those government 
bureaucrats and politicians dealing closely with 
Chinese affairs have misread Chinese foreign policy. 
Even on President Nixon’s visit to Beijing that was 
the beginning of US-China rapprochement, they 
were wrong: “Nixon did not first reach out to China; 
instead, China, in the person of Mao, first reached 
out to Nixon. Americans just didn’t realize it;”15 
“the administration soon made numerous offers of 
covert military assistance to China---all based on 
false assumption that it was building a permanent 
cooperative relationship with China . . . ;”16 and so, 
since “the China supporters in the Bush administra-
tion put the best possible spin on events,”17 “[n]o 
one I worked with at the CIA or the Pentagon in the 
1980s raised the idea that China could deceive the 
United States or be the cause of a major intelligence 
failure.”18 Despite unfavorable and disadvantageous 
events taking place against the interest of the 
US, “even these revelations did little to shake our 
complacency and optimism about China”19 and “[m]ost 
American officials ignored the anti-American signs 
altogether”20 and even when they were aware of the 
instruction not to translate anti-American commen-
taries, the author admits that “I was still not a China 
skeptic. Many channels of intelligence seemed to 
prove that this was all a passing phase.”21 
II
Why does the United States tend to take a 
persistent denial mode of thinking when it comes to 
dealing with China in the face of objective evidence 
disadvantageous to its own interest? The author 
explains “[m]any of us who study China have been 
taught to view the country as a helpless victim of 
Western imperialists―a notion that China’s leaders 
not only believe, but also actively encourage.”22 “This 
perspective―the desire to help China at all costs, the 
almost willful blindness to any actions that undercut 
our views of Chinese goodwill and victimhood―has 
colored the U.S. government’s approach to dealing 
with China.”23 Such perspective is deeply grounded 
in numerous stories told by Christian missionaries 
in China as reflected in Pearl S. Buck’s The Good 
Earth (1931).24 The United States was the most 
generous and tolerant to China than any other coun-
tries, and such basic attitude has remained the same 
today. As John van Antwerp MacMurray attested at 
length in his “1935 Memorandum on Developments 
Affecting American Policy in the Far East,”25 the 
United States, having few realistic interests in China, 
tended to trust China’s potentials and preferred to 
adopt a rather idealistic policy. The same attitude 
is evident throughout the book. George F. Kennan 
attributes it to “a certain sentimentality toward 
the Chinese―a sentimentality as disrespectful to 
them and as unhelpful to the long-term interests of 
11 P. 15. 
12 P. 303.
13 Ibid.
14 P. xi
15 P. 56.
16 P. 60.
17 P. 95.
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19 P. 96.
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24 A paperback edition is available at Washington Square Press, New York (1958).
25 It is included in How the Peace Was Lost (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1992) edited by Arthur Waldron with an introduction and notes. 
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our relations as the feelings of blind petulance into 
which it now has a tendency to turn.”26 For Japan, on 
the other hand, China was a country indispensable 
to it economically as well as politically, and the situ-
ation has not changed today. That gap or difference 
in their respective interests toward China between 
the United States and Japan has produced totally 
different policy toward China. 
Historically, US-Japan relations have been 
constantly affected and troubled by the develop-
ments of US-China relations. The common denomi-
nator in trilateral relations among the United States, 
China and Japan is the United States. The competing 
relations between the US-Japan relationship and the 
US-China relationship bifurcate with the United 
States as a pivot. Even though China and Japan share 
the United States as a common pivot, the obvious 
difference in interests exists in their respective poli-
cies toward China between the United States and 
Japan. That difference creates an irregular triangle, 
and the bottom side of this triangle represents the 
Sino-Japan relationship, ref lecting the competing 
interests of the US-Japan relationship on the one 
hand and the US-China relationship on the other. 
And behind the US-China relationship are, of course, 
American business leaders interested in China trade 
from the days of the American clipper ships of the 
19th century.
Professor Ar thur Waldron who edited Mr. 
MacMurray’s 1935 Memorandum in the form of 
How the Peace Was Lost27 made an interesting 
observation on the dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance in 1923 in the course of the Washington 
Conference of 1921-22. He says it is more accurate to 
ascribe the abrogation of the alliance to not so much 
Britain’s Asian policy as Britain’s policy toward the 
United States. For the sake of mental exercise, let us 
convert Professor Waldron’s analysis of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance to the US-Japanese Alliance. We 
will be able to see the problems Japan faces today 
more clearly.
For China the US-Japan Alliance is a thorn in 
China’s side, and China is trying to drive a wedge in 
the US-Japan relationship and working very hard in 
suggesting, more than once, the United States recog-
nize China’s new major power relationship with the 
United States. Whether the United States changes its 
perception of its relations with China will depend on 
when the United States will consider it more profit-
able and advantageous for the United States to shake 
hands with China just like Nixon’s sudden decision 
to visit China in 1971. What it means is that the 
termination of the US-Japan Security Treaty would 
be effected by not so much the United States’ Asian 
policy as its policy toward China.
The importance of China has increased enor-
mously not merely as a vast market, but as “the world 
factory” that drives the world economy, and so has 
the importance of China as an increasingly growing 
military power at a colossal rate. The United States 
needs China as the world No. 2 economy for its own 
economic prosperity. The growing military power 
capable of challenging the United States presence in 
the western Pacific Ocean prompts the United States 
to deepen its understanding of China as a major 
military power and to develop the mutually accept-
able “code of conduct” with China. Since 2014 the 
Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has 
been invited by the United States to participate in its 
largest naval exercise Rimpac.28 
If we peruse a series of events surrounding the 
USS Lassen’s so-called freedom of navigation oper-
ations (FONOP) of October 27, 2015,29 we would 
appreciate the extent of US-China coordination and 
cooperation: (1) pronouncements and leaks made by 
U.S. officials of the planned “freedom of navigation” 
operations well in advance; (2) radio communica-
tions to the PLA Navy that the Lassen’s operations 
were not harmful nor discriminatory to China;30 (3) 
a video conference on October 29 between top U.S. 
and China naval officers (Chief of Naval Operations, 
Adm. John Richardson and Commander of the PLA 
26 George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, Expanded Edition, 1984, p. 53.
27 See supra note 25. 
28 “China joins RIMPAC naval exercise for the first time,” Jul. 2, 2014, Global Times; available at  
<http://www.globaltimes.cn/daily-specials/china-rimpac-2014/> 
29 Sam LaGore, “U.S. Destroyer Comes Within 12 Nautical Miles of Chinese South China Sea Artificial Island, Beijing Threatens Response,” Oct. 27, 
2015, USNI News; available at
 <http://news.usni.org/2015/10/27/u-s-destroyer-comes-within-12-nautical-miles-of-chinese-south-china-sea-artificial-island-beijing-threatens-response> 
and see  Christopher P. Cavas, “Navy Chiefs Talk, New Details On Destroyer's Passage,” Oct. 31, 2015, DefenseNews; available at  
 <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2015/10/31/navy-china-richardson-wu-destroyer-lassen-south-china-sea-innocent-passage/74881704/> 
30 Yeganeh Torbati, “Despite agreements, risks linger of U.S.-China naval mishaps,” Oct. 30, 2015, Reuters; available at 
 <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-usa-communications-idUSKCN0SO0E220151030> 
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Navy, Adm. Wu Shengli);31 (4) Commander of the 
U.S. Pacific Command, Adm. Harry Harris’s visit 
to Beijing on November 2;32 and (5) the first U.S.-
China joint naval exercise in the Atlantic Ocean on 
November 7; (6) the USS Stethem’s visit to Shanghai 
on November 16;33 and, may I add, (7) the White 
House’s instructions to Defense officials to be quiet 
about the Lassen’s FONOP.34 
They all give the impression that the Lassen’s 
FONOP was scripted, choreographed and well-
staged in the name of “freedom of navigation.”35 
So much so, immediately after the USS Lassen’s 
FONOP in the South China Sea, the United States 
conducted, as if nothing had happened, the first 
U.S.-China joint naval exercise in the Atlantic Ocean 
on November 7, 2015.36 There is no question that 
different perceptions about China are developing 
between the United States and Japan. 
III
With these sobering revelations about the U.S.-
China relations and the presence of Xi Jinping in 
the helm today as the aggressive promotor of the 
“Chinese Dream,” we need to examine the implica-
tions of the different interests at stake between the 
United States and Japan toward China. A series of 
recent events relating to the freedom of navigation 
operations by the United States Navy in the waters 
around the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea 
has allowed us to catch a glimpse of the future of the 
US-China relationship. Therein lies the warning of 
Dr. Pillsbury to Japan.
The so-called Freedom of Navigation Operations 
(FONOP) by the USS Lassen within 12 nautical 
miles of an artificial island built on Subi Reef in the 
Spratly Islands on October 27, 2015 was abundantly 
commented on and analyzed by many articles in The 
Diplomat.37 There is no need to recap the analysis 
here except to re-confirm that the Lassen chose 
not to “fly, sail, and operate wherever international 
law allows,” as Secretary of Defense Ash Carter 
announced.38 It demonstrated by deed its respect 
for the territorial boundary of sea and air space of 
the Subi Reef artificial island. Such a conclusion 
is further reinforced by the Pentagon’s explanation 
that a B-52 bomber’s f light on December 10, 2015 
within two nautical miles of Cuarteron Reef in the 
Spratly Islands was “unintentional.” That is, the 
B-52 bomber did not plan to fly to within 12 nautical 
miles, and according to the Wall Street Journal, bad 
weather had contributed to the pilot flying off course 
and into the area claimed by China.39 Who would 
believe such explanation? The B-52 denied its own 
freedom of flight over the high seas, as recognized 
by the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and 
customary international law.40 The Pentagon did not 
maintain that it exercised its lawful right under inter-
national law. Rather, as consistently demonstrated 
above, the U.S. Navy and Air Force recognize the 
territorial sea as well as space claimed by China in 
the Spratly Islands, if not the South China Sea.
31 Christopher P. Cavas, “US, Chinese Naval Chiefs To Talk,” Oct. 28, 2015, Defense News; available at
 <http://www.defensenews.com/story/breaking-news/2015/10/28/chief-of-naval-operations-admiral-john-richardson-wu-shengli-china-plan-navy-
warships-ship-lassen-south-china-sea-spratly-artificial-islands/74747200/> 
32 Associated Press, “US Pacific commander says sailing by Chinese islands was not a military threat,” Nov. 3, 2015, The Guardian; available at
 <http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/nov/03/us-pacific-commander-says-sailing-by-chinese-islands-was-not-a-military-threat> 
33 “U.S. Navy destroyer Stethem visits Shanghai,” Nov. 17, 2015, China Military News; available at
 <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2015-11/17/content_6773547.htm> The visit was followed by the China-U.S. joint 
naval exercise in the South China sea. See Franz-Stefan Gady, “China and US Hold Joint Naval Exercise,” Nov. 18, 2015, The Diplomat; available at
  <http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/china-and-us-hold-joint-naval-exercise/n>   
34 Helene Cooper & Jane Perlez, “White House Moves to Reassure Allies With South China Sea Patrol, but Quietly,” Oct. 27, 2015, N.Y. Times; available at
 <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/28/world/asia/south-china-sea-uss-lassen-spratly-islands.html?_r=3> 
35 See Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Make No Mistake--- The United States Should Get Its Message Straight in the South China Sea,” Nov. 25, 2015, Foreign 
Affairs; available at 
 <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-11-25/make-no-mistake> 
36 Chinese, U.S. navies conduct first joint drill in Atlantic, Nov. 9, 2015, Defense News; available at
 <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2015-11/09/content_4627988.htm>  
37 Ankit Panda, “Everything You Wanted to Know About the USS Lassen's FONOP in the South China Sea,” Jan. 6, 2016, The Diplomat; available at
  <http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/everything-you-wanted-to-know-about-the-uss-lassens-fonop-in-the-south-china-sea/> 
38 “Carter says U.S. will sail, fly and operate wherever international law allows,” Oct. 13, 2015, Reuters; available at 
 <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-australia-southchinasea-carter-idUSKCN0S72MG20151013> 
39 Jeremy Page & Gordon Lubold, “U.S. Bomber Flies Over Waters Claimed by China,” Dec. 18, 2015, Wall Street Journal ; available at 
 <http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-jet-flies-over-waters-claimed-by-china-1450466358> 
40 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part VII, Section 1, Article 87.1(b); available at 
 <http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf> 
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IV
With the airport on Subi Reef completed, U.S. 
policy of being neutral to territorial and maritime 
disputes has allowed the rule of naked power to 
prevail. As China increases its A2/AD capabili-
ties,41 these airports constructed on a few atolls and 
shoals in the strategic points in the South China 
Sea will compensate for the absence of an aircraft 
carrier large enough to accommodate heavy and 
large aircraft, and it may not be so far away for 
the East China Sea and the South China Sea to be 
effectively controlled by China.42 The United States 
seems to have accepted that reality. Unlike the USS 
Lassen’s FONOP last year, when the USS Curtis 
Wilbur, a guided missile destroyer, sailed within 
12 nautical miles of a disputed island in the South 
China Sea on January 30, 2016, Pentagon spokesman 
Jeff Davis formerly announced that it made the 
“innocent passage” off Triton Island in the Paracel 
Island chain, which is claimed by China, Taiwan and 
Vietnam.43 
It is significant that the Pentagon acknowledges 
that it conducted the “innocent passage” because 
the notion of “innocent passage” exists only in the 
territorial waters of the coastal state.44 Which means 
the Pentagon acknowledges that the waters around 
Triton Island are the territorial waters of that coastal 
state. Although the Pentagon official claimed that 
the operation was conducted “to challenge excessive 
maritime claims of parties that claim the Paracel 
Islands,”45 the conduct of “innocent passage” does 
not challenge the lawful authority of the coastal 
state. International law does not require prior notifi-
cation to enter the territorial sea under the innocent 
passage regime.46
The apparent discordance among ASEAN 
member governments on the manner of settlement 
of South China Sea disputes indicates not only the 
presence of competing and crisscrossing interests 
among ASEAN member countries,47 but also an 
undeniable Chinese influence. China uses its most 
preferred mode of “bi-lateral negotiations” between 
the two parties directly concerned with the issue 
at stake, rejecting the involvement of any outside 
parties just like its refusal to participate in the inter-
national arbitration case filed by the Philippines.48 
China thus deals with one country at a time from the 
position of strength. All countries want to benefit 
from China’s riches. China’s Renminbi will become 
an international currency as one of the IMF’s SDR 
basket currencies on October 1, 2016.49 The world 
should welcome the internationalization of the 
Renminbi as a source of global liquidity. But China 
pursues policy of outward expansion with impunity 
in defiance of international norms and practice.50 
41 See Christopher J. McCarthy, “Anti-Access/Area Denial: The Evolution of Modern Warfare;” available at 
 <https://www.usnwc.edu/Lucent/OpenPdf.aspx?id=95> and Andrew Krepinevich et al., “Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge,” Center 
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (2003); available at 
 <http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2003/05/a2as-anti-access-area-denial/>
42 Eisuke Suzuki, “The Post-War International Order with Chinese Characteristics and the “Enemy State” Clauses of the United Nations Charter,” Journal 
of Policy Studies, No. 49, Mar. 2015 (Kwansei Gakuin University Policy Studies Association), at 23, 34-39. 
43 “US warship sails by island claimed by China: Pentagon,” Jan. 30, 2016, AFP; available at
 <http://news.yahoo.com/us-warship-sailed-waters-off-island-claimed-china-005832507.html> 
44 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part II, Section 3, Articles 17 & 18; available at 
 <http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf> 
45 A remark of the Pentagon spokesman, referred to at supra note 43.
46 The question of the notification requirement was settled by the two most powerful naval countries of the Cold War, the USA and USSR, through the 
issuance in 1989 of a Joint Statement on the Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage, which provided as 
follows:
“All ships, including warships, regardless of cargo, armament, or means of propulsion enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea 
in accordance with international law, for which neither prior notification nor authorization is required.”
 Quoted in Simon O. Williams, “Maritime Security: The Concept of Innocent Passage,” Nov. 9, 2015, the Maritime Executive; available at 
 <http://www.maritime-executive.com/features/Maritime-Security-Private-The-Concept-of-Innocent-Passage> 
47 Yeganeh Torbati & Trinna Leong, “ASEAN defense chiefs fail to agree on South China Sea statement,” Nov. 4, 2015; available at 
 <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean-malaysia-statement-idUSKCN0ST07G20151104> 
48 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on 4 June 2014; available at 
 <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1162256.shtml> and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Position Paper of the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines,” 7 Dec. 
2014, at 30: China has always insisted that disputes should be “peacefully resolved theough negotiations between the countries directly concerned;” 
available at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/ yzs_663350/xwlb_663352/t1217147.shtml> 
49 IMF, “Chinese Renminbi to be Identified in the IMF’s Currency Composition of Foreign Exchange Reserves,” Press Release No. 16/90, Mar. 4, 2016; 
available at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2016/pr1690.htm>
50 See Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century (New York:Basic Books, 2010). 
95
E.Suzuki,   The Hundred-Year Marathon: Michael Pillsbury’s Warnings to Japan
The more the Renminbi is used as an inter-
national settlement currency, the more it will be 
considered China’s challenge to the Bretton Woods 
system. The grandiose vision of “The Silk Road 
Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk 
Road” or otherwise known as “the Belt and Road 
Initiative”51 is designed to create a vast economic 
zone embracing a new Eurasian economic belt in 
the north and a new maritime route in the south 
starting from the eastern seaboard of China through 
the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and Middle 
Eastern and East African countries to the EU. It 
is the wing that will lift the development of “the 
Renminbi Financial Zone.” The AIIB is a vehicle to 
realize that Chinese dream.52 What China aims at 
would be the establishment of  China-centric world 
order with the renewal of its global tributary system.
It cannot be denied that the funding source of 
China’s military expansion is the growing supply of 
the Renminbi. With the internationalization of the 
Chinese currency together with the opening of the 
Euro-Renminbi market in the City, London, under 
the auspices of the U.K. government, China will 
be in a more advantageous position to print more 
Renminbi bills at will and its military power will 
expand correspondingly. As Pillsbury remarked on 
the basis of the RAND Corporation’s study, “From 
now through 2030, the Chinese will have more 
than $1 trillion available to spend on new weapons 
for their navy and air force”53. “This,” concludes 
Pillsbury, “paints a picture of near parity, if not 
outright Chinese superiority, by mid-century. The 
future military balance of power is slowly shifting, 
from a ten-to-one U.S. superiority, toward equality, 
and then eventually to Chinese superiority.”54 Before 
that happens, I suspect influential American busi-
ness leaders, who are major donors to presidential 
campaigns and “eager to maintain their growing 
relationships and business opportunities” in China, 
will lobby the administration to promote and protect 
their vast business and commercial opportunities “as 
China almost certainly promise[s] to be the largest 
emerging market in the world.”55 New support 
will be no doubt “mobilized in Congress, based on 
constituents’ economic interests.”56 Sooner or later, 
the United States would make a move to protect its 
own interest by providing America’s goodwill and 
assistance to China as usual because of “a certain 
sentimentality toward the Chinese” as George 
Kennan pointed out long ago.57 
We have to be prepared for that eventuality, 
so that we would not repeat the same fate of being 
dumbfounded at the United States’ rapprochement 
with the Communist China in 1971. The so-called 
Nixon Shock and its resultant humiliation, sorrow, 
disappointment, and anger at being bypassed by 
the United States, with which we thought we had a 
special relationship, taught us a lesson. To maintain 
the close relationship with the United States cannot 
be the sole purpose and objective of Japan’s foreign 
policy, but a means to safeguard Japan’s interest. 
Kei Wakaizumi, who was a covert go-between and 
negotiator as Prime Minister Eisuke Sato’s personal 
representative in negotiations between the United 
States and Japan on the reversion of Okinawa to 
Japan from 1968 to 1974, offered his last advice 
before he took his life in 1996 as follows:
Relations between countries are naturally 
never static or permanent and differ from the 
ties that exist between individuals. A thor-
ough and comprehensive reassessment of the 
amicable and cooperative bilateral relation-
ship, centered as it has been since the war on 
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, is inevitable. 
Such a review will necessarily lead to a redefi-
nition of the relationship based on the long-
term, fundamental goals and ideologies of 
51 See Tian Shaohui (ed.), “Chronology of China's Belt and Road Initiative,” Xinhuanet, Mar. 28, 2015; available at 
 <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/28/c_134105435.htm>   
52 President Xi Jinping’s remarks at the Asian-African Summit held on April 22-23, 2015 in Jakarta, Indonesia: “China will, together with other parties 
concerned, promote the construction of the "Belt and Road", earnestly build the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and bring the role of the 
Silk Road Fund into full play. China will continue to facilitate the South-South cooperation and South-North cooperation, so as to jointly safeguard peace 
and stability in the region as well as the world and promote common development and prosperity.” 
 <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpdbjstjxgsfwbfydnxycxyfldrhyhwlhy60znjnhd/t1258694.shtml> 
53 P. 141.
54 Ibid. 
55 P. 90.
56 Id. at 91. 
57 George F. Kennan attributes it to “a certain sentimentality toward the Chinese—a sentimentality as disrespectful to them and as unhelpful to the long-
term interests of our relations as the feelings of blind petulance into which it now has a tendency to turn.” American Diplomacy, Expanded Edition 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 53.
96
Journal  of  Policy  Studies   No.52 (September  2016)
the two countries and will require that the 
Japanese people (in the interests of Asia and 
the rest of the world, as well as America) 
begin to clearly and confidently articulate, in 
universal terms, Japan’s ideals and national 
interests.58 
We have to prepare ourselves for the inevi-
table U.S. acceptance of China’s offer of “major-
country relationship with the United States,”59 
which President Xi Jinping has been seeking. It is an 
open secret that China considers the Pacific Ocean 
large enough to accommodate the United States 
and China, the former controlling the eastern half 
of the Pacific Ocean and the latter controlling the 
western half of the Ocean. Such scenario has already 
been played out by none other than Foreign Policy 
magazine’s simulation exercise over the Senkaku 
Islands:60 “the last thing in the world we want is to 
start a shooting war with the world’s only other super 
power over a bunch of worthless rocks.”61 What is in 
effect projected is, I would suspect, the U.S.-China 
condominium of the Pacific Ocean, and the Lassen’s 
innocent passage was a prelude to the shaking hands 
of the United States with China, allowing China 
effective control of not only the East China Sea 
alone, but also the western Pacific Ocean. And that 
is the warning given by Dr. Pillsbury to Japan. ### 
58 Wakaizumi, Kei,The Best Course Available: A Personal Account of the Secret U.S.-Japan Okinawa Reversion Negotiations (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 2002), at 25. 
59 President Xi Jinping’s speech at “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” Anniversary,” 8 June 2014; available at
 <https://www.google.co.uk/?gfe_rd=cr&ei=nX66U63qFIvR8geiz4HoBQ&gws_rd=ssl#q=xi+jinping's+remarks+on+Five+Principles+for+Peaceful+CO
EXISTENCE&spell=1> 
60 Dan de Luce & Keith Johnson, “How FP Stumbled Into a War With China---and Lost,” Jan. 15, 2016, Foreign Policy ; available at 
 <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/15/how-fp-stumbled-into-a-war-with-china-and-lost/> .. 
61 Ibid.
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